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Introduction
When President Geisel was inaugurated in 1974,
there were widespread hopes that Brazil would
move toward less authoritarian rule. Geisel was
not the choice of his predecessors, but succeeded
in winning the nomination in spite of the opposi-
tion of the alliance between a particular army
faction, public sector technocrats and entre-
preneurs which had ruled the country since 1967.
Indeed, many Brazilians interpreted Geisel's
success as a shift of the political spectrum back
toward the liberal rhetoric that had inspired the
1964 coup d'état under Castelo Branco's leader-
ship. Not only did Geisel in his inauguration
speech make a firm commitment toward political
softening, but many of the members of his per-
sonally chosen cabinet were old Castelo Branco
style liberals. And by the end of Geisel's in-
auguration year, when Brazilians were called to
vote at the first politically meaningful elections
since 1964, the opposition won by what could
only be regarded by Brazilian standards as an
overwhelming landslide, and without causing any
immediate visible hard-liner backlash.
By mid 1975, however, the cracks became visible
in Geisel's political position. Detailed reports of
the corruption of the previous Medici govern-
ment were publicised, revealing that the new
dealers needed tc prove themselves better than
their predecessors. And when a new wave of
political arrests and tortures took place, culmina-
ting with the 'suicide' of a well-known and res-
pected journalist Wiado Hertzog while detained
at Sao Paulo's army headquarters, without the
President being able to prevent it, one minister is
said to have regarded it as "the beginning of the
struggle between the SS and the Wehrmacht."
Since then Geisel's support has eroded continu-
ously. This process has culminated in the recent
mini coup d'état when Geisel suspended the con-
gress and altered the constitution by decree in
order virtually to attempt to annihilate the op-
position party.
The historical context of Brazilian militarism
It is difficult to explain the dilemmas in which
the regime now finds itself without going back to
the military's particular role in Brazil's history.
The behaviour of the Brazilian army as an
institution as well as the ideology of its leaders is
difficult to explain in terms of the social extrac-
tion and recruitment of the officer corps. Instead,
the crucial factor since the last decades of the
19th century in a fast growing and changing
country such as Brazil has been the fact that the
army was the only permanent and nationally
inclusive institution where everything else was
changing. The army was an institution devoted
by definition to warfare and to the concept of
the motherland, in a country that lacked both
economic and political integration, being ruled
by coffee barons in the region of Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, by cattle caudilhos in the south,
by sugar landlords in the coast of the north
east and not ruled at all on something like 95
per cent of its territory. In the Brazil of 1900,
where almost any national institution or even the
very concept of nation was a fiction, the army
was a special kind of fiction.
The military then, clearly had to train its leaders
for professional warfare. It sent them to Europe,
where they learned the essential rules of the
military game, including two which were destined
to play a crucial far-reaching role. First, they
learned that a modern army could not survive if
it was prone to local and regional loyalties. Hence
a pattern of periodic shifting of troop com-
manders through every region of the huge ter-
ritory was introduced. Second, they learned that
the fundamental conditions of successful warfare
include industrial production and logistics. Thus
by the early l920s the army had become a unique
institution in that it alone contained a core of
reasonably well-educated people with direct
knowledge, both physical and social, of the coun-
try as a whole; who were ideologically committed
to the inculcation of a sense of national identity;
and were also committed to modernisation and
industrialisation. These features became manifest
in the mid 1920s through a series of military
revolts (1922-24 and 1930)1 known as Tenentismo
(the lieutenants' movement). Although this move-
ment was precipitated by several more immediate
issues, it was essentially the result of a prise de.
conscience among young officers of the army's
1 The revolution of 1930 which led Getulio Vargas to power
cannot be considered a Tenentista revolution. However, besides
having been strongly influenced by the lieutenants, it also
brought one of their facti:ns to power.
modernising mission.2 From the 1920s up to the
1940s and 1950s, when the former lieutenants
had become generals, they came in a sense to
regard themselves as the nation's tutors.
From the nineteenth century the army had also
begun to take on important economic responsi-
bujes, including road building and the establish-
ment of settlements in the previously almost un-
populated areas of the vast hinterland. During the
present century, additional functions were
assumed under the influence of Tenentismo. In
the early 1930s the first air transport service,
Correio Aereo Nacional, was created by the army.
In 1933 army officers pressed President Getulio
Vargas into passing a law giving the State control
over hydro-electric and mineral resources. In the
late 1930s when Vargas, who had become a
dictator in 1937, was undecided between the
Allies and the Axis but was leaning toward Hitler,
the Americans succeeded in securing the Brazilian
army's support, partly by promising to construct
Brazil's first large steel mill at Volta Redonda,
halfway between Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
Moreover, the long national debate known as
the Oil Campaign, which began in the late 1940s
and led to the creation of Petrobras (the state-
owned monopoly of oil drilling and refining) in
1954 was mainly inspired by nationalist sectors
of the army.
Nationalism, of course, is by no means an ex-
ceptional or a peculiar feature of the Brazilian
military. Their uniqueness lies rather in the strong
managerial and technocratic character it
developed. This emçrged as a by-product of the
beliefin the words of a saying common in
Brazilian military circlesthat they are the only
force able to "lead their Homeland to the accom-
plishment of its historical destiny as a world
power."
Needless to say, this missionary sentiment has
always implied very ambiguous feelings toward
civilians. The latter are regarded as intrinsically
devoted to the egotistic pursuit of self-interest,
corrupt, ignorant, incompetent and unable to lead
the country toward its predestined role among
the world powers. Nevertheless, civilians are after
all also the essential raw material for the building
of the Homeland. Their skills, such as expertise
in industrial management, economic and financial
affairs, cannot be dispensed with though they must
2 For a better account on Tenenjismo, see V. Santa Rosa,
O qu foi o Tenentismo'. Boris Fausto in 'Pequenos ensqiosde Historia da Republics' argues that the New Military School
of Rsalengo, with its emphasis on training technical profes-
sionalised soldiers as opposed to the positivist orientated old
'Praia Vermeiho' School, was crucial for the shaping of the
Tenentes gen ration.
be exerted under military inspiration and surveil-
lance.
In 1949 the National War College (ESG) was
created in order to develop and transmit the
knowledge necessary for the management of the
nation and the planning of national security. As
Regis de Castro Andrade points out, the ESG
has never been a purely military institution, but
more a centre for the elaboration of a political
doctrine for both military and civilian elements.
By 1960 it had graduated 200 higher civil
servants, 39 members of parliament, 23 judges,
224 businessmen from industry and commerce,
and 107 assorted professionals, such as lecturers,
economists, writers, medical doctors and catholic
clergy, a total of 693 civilians outweighing the
599 military graduates.3
Andrade is certainly correct of course, when he
relates the creation of the ESG to the Cold War
context. But whatever the nature of the 'enemy'
or the strictly military aspect of the soldiers' twin
ideological prinicples of national security and
development, they always regarded themselves as
the civilians' tutors, and in spite of strong US
and multinational influence never gave up their
sense of mission regarding domestic affairs.
The vanishing miracle
When the soldiers took power in 1964 they had
found a situation amounting to what would later
be called stagflation, except that Brazil had it in
elephantine doses: that is, a negative rate of
economic growth associated with inflation at
87 per cent per annum. On the political scene,
the similarity with events that have taken place
in other Latin American countries, such as
Uruguay and Chile, is far more more apparent
than real. For better of for worse the Brazilian
military did have a political and economic pro-ject for the country. This is not to say that they
had a single, clearly defined political and econ-
omic model to impose on the country, nor that
they were united under the same banner at any
particular period of time, not even during the
crucial months before and after the 1964 coup.
But it does mean that it is an oversimplification
to say that in overthrowing Goulart they merely
played the role of a praetorian guard for local
dominant classes and US economic interests.
I believe this helps to understand some of the
many contradictions since the 1964 coup. While
the rhetoric of those days was liberal and the
slogan was that it was the civilians who had
3 See Regis de Castro Andrade, Brazil; the Military in Politics,
Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow.
called the army to intervene, both to fight com-
munist subversion and to eliminate state economic
intervention, the bourgeoisie soon realised that
the outcome would differ from their expectations.
On the political front the return to free elections
and to civilan rule soon came to seem less re-
mote only than the return of the Messiah. And
as regards economic policy, by 1976 the state-
owned sector accounted for over 60 per cent of
capital formation.
The economic adventures and misadventures of
the Brazilian military regimes since 1964 are well-
known and there is no need to outline them here:
deflation and recession followed by booming
economic growth that was, to a large extent, made
possible by starvation levels of exploitation of the
labour force and harsh political repression; then
from 1974 inflation moving upwards again to
reach 47 per cent in 1976.
When Geisel took over it was already clear that
the miracle was vanishing. However, it is not
possible to explain his abortive political new deal
solely in terms of worsening economic conditions.
The very fact that Geisel had succeeded in im-
posing himself as the army's Crown Prince as
early as 1971, long before economic misfortunes
were visible, shows that it was not inflation and
growth per se, but the growing gap between the
nation's project as perceived by military rhetoric
on one hand and real developments on the other,
that was the fundamental issue.
In 1970 the results of the national demographic
and economic census demonstrated the extent to
which inequality in incomes had increased over
the past 10 years. The figures were so striking
that they generated a debate in the press that
became a major national issue. Despite harsh
press censorship the regime could not prevent the
debate from occurring, since management, both
public and private, could not plan ahead without
credible çensus figures. In any case, there was
no need to spell the conclusions out as they had
been felt, seen and lived by every citizen except
those in the upper 2 per cent income bracket.
Soon afterwards several more standard of living
indicators were published and demonstrated de-
clining per capita consumption of essential com-
modities and staple food and increasing infant
mortality and epidemics. Indeed in 1972, when
economic growth was at its highest (11 per cent),
even President Medici felt moved in a public
speech to utter the phrase that may identify him
historically in the future: "Brazil is doing better
than ever but Brazilians are doing worse than
ever."
More graphic than the most sophisticated analysis
by a political scientist, President Medici's state-
ment shows the extent to which State and Nation,
the government and the people, had become
separated under military rule in Brazil. Because
the hierarchical structure of the army makes it
difficult for officers to make their opinions public
unless authorised by their superiors, very little
is known about the reactions of army officers to
the facts made public in 197 1-72. Very little also
is known about the clashes within the army which
led to Geisel, instead of one of Medici's own
men, being appointed incoming president. How-
ever, both from widespread rumours and from
what one may deduce from public speeches by
senior government ministers on economic and
welfare issues, it seems that many high-ranking
officers shared the bitter feeling that the army
had played the role of sorcerer's apprentice rather
than that of guardian and tutor to the nation.
When the minister of finance, Delfim Netto, had
produced his "The cake must grow before we
may share it" theory in an attempt to neutralise
internal opposition within the regime, he was
hardly convincing. In fact, even those who may
have agreed with the argument itself, thought that
the model had to be changed. The selection of
Geisel against his predecessor's will was probably
less a reflection of a rift within the army than
a general shift within it in search of new methods
of tutorship. He was not only regarded as a
nationalist, but also as Chairman of Petrobras,
had been a successful military manager of a large,
profit-making state-owned company. It was
believed he was not likely to be misled by civilian
technocrats as Medici had been by Delfim Netto
and his fellow economists.
The pressures of the objective political context
as well as of the process of ideological revision
within the army also required concessions by the
regime in order to allow a highereven if never
very clearly defineddegree of participation by
public opinion. In the past 10 years the absence
of any political meaning in previous elections
and harsh censorship had proved themselves a
double-edged knife Since they had taken over in
1964, the military leaders had never actually
stated that they would prevent elections and
abolish meaningful political parties. Nor could
they have ever admitted the institution of an
openly totalitarian regime. The very rationale of
their intervention, in terms of their own internal
ideology, and not just for external consumption,
was that it had been to prevent civiliansthe
supporters of Goulartfrom establishing just
such a regime. Moreover, the USA whose partici-
pation in helping to stage and trigger off the coup
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was scarcely a secret was still in the mood of
Kennedy's Camelot promises and LBJ's Great
Society, and could not allow itself to be involved
in the creation of an open dictatorship in Latin
America in that particular context.
Finally, as the self-appointed tutors of civil
society, the Brazilian soldiers included the political
education of the masses among their functions.
Sometime in the future the Brazilian lower classes
would become politically mature enough to parti-
cipate freely in electoral games like their older
brothers in the Anglo-Saxon countrieswithout
ruining the festival.
This helps to explain the inner political contra-
dictions which have prevented the Brazilian
military from institutionalising its regime and
from adopting as its openly acknowledged
ideology and authoritarianism it practises. It also
suggests why they never attempted to develop a
fascist or Nasserite style of mass mobilisation. As
Cardoso points out, the regime is guided by dual
principles: the constitutional order which antici-
pates elections; and the institutional acts which
transform the military President into a de facto
dictator as long as the political order is perceived
to be threatened according to criteria determined
by the organs of military security.4
One of the army's first acts after the 1964 coup
had been to purge "subversive elements" from
every national institution, such as the courts,
schools, government corporations, the congress
and local councils, political parties and the army
itself. A large number of politically significant
citizens, including 92 officers and over 30
generals, were banished (cassados) and lost their
political rights. The next step was to force the
many pre-coup political parties to merge into
two single large ones: ARENA and MDB. Both
parties were a creation of the Revolution and
were supposed and understood to be faithful and
committed to its principles. Although ARENA
was labelled the government party and MDB was
supposed to play the role of loyal opposition, the
identity between the two in practice was believed
to be so complete that many members of the
congress did not care much to which party they
were assigned.5 Their lack of political substance
became so apparent that at every election between
1964 and 1974 (voting being compulsory) electors
who really wished to express their opposition to
the regime cast blank ballots instead of voting
4 S re F. H. Cardoao "Capitalist Development and the State:
Bases and alternatives" unpublished paper presented at Cam-
bridge on 18th December 1976.
S Since their crration up to the end of the 1960s, Brazilians
have sarcastically called ARENA the party of 'Yes' and MDB
the one of 'Yes Sir'!
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MDB. Indeed, by the 1972 administrative elec-
tions blank ballots had become the majority.
This meant that the MDB continually lost votes
and seats while both loyalists and rural-controlled
electors stuck to the rules of the fiction and voted
ARENA. This eventually, however, forced MDB
to shift from nominal to active opposition. And
although it practised studied moderation and did
its best not to challenge the legitimacy of the
regime or even of military rule, it began increas-
ingly to gain votes again. After Geisel took office
in 1974, the very dynamic of its new political
course forced MDB to adopt more radical posi-
tions, pressing for a liberalisation of the regime
and for a return to direct Presidential and State
government elections after the end of Geisel's
term of office.
Transformations in the hegemonic alliance
From the time of its assumption of power the
military has been faced with a growing contra-
diction in its class alliance. The original military
takeover of 1964 had in effect been a conspiracy
between the officer corps and sectors of the
national bourgeoisie, with financial support and
technical help both from US government and
American multinationals. Yet the economic pro-
grammes adopted by the military government-
partly as a result of the doctrines of the National
War College (ESG)have in effect brought into
being a new political force: the technocrats and
managers of public sector enterprises who have
become a powerful fraction of the emerging
hegemonic alliance.
In spite of the economic liberalism that provided
the ideological cloak for their assumption of
office, the generals not only did not dismantle the
state-owned sector of the economy during their
first decade in office, but were actually driven to
strengthen it. By 1975 state enterprises accounted
for more than half of public sector investment
and more than 30 per cent of total investment. In
the same year 56 of the 100 largest Brazilian
enterprises were state-owned.6 In addition, a
degree of state control of the activities of privately-
owned enterprises is ensured by the fact that
most of them are indebted to state-owned banks
such as BNDE (National Bank For Economic
Development).
In sum, the Brazilian military has actually been
shaping a new form of state capitalism and crea-
ting a new class of public entrepreneurs or, as it
is called sometimes, a state bourgeoisie whose
interests are far from identical to those of private
6 Cardoso idem
entrepreneurs. Several authors such as Cardoso,
O'Donnel and Sunkel have analysed the role of
state intervention in capitalist industrialisation.
What I am mainly concerned with here, however,
are not the broad contradictions originating from
the State's role in assisting capital accumulation
by multinationals and to a lesser extent, local
entrepreneurs; but a second level of contradic-
tions which prevent the institutionalisation of a
stable regime in Brazil.
Whatever its rhetoric, the Brazilian military coup
of 1964 in fact amounted to the replacement of
a particular alliance of dominant classes which
depended on the populist participation of the
masses, by a new state and hegemonic alliance
which excluded these masses and merely regarded
them as a source for capital accumulation. In
these circumstances, the maintenance of a liberal-
democratic facade, the creation of sanitized
political parties and of the Congress and the hold-
ing of elections, have proved to be a time-bomb
The military had believed that the de facto ex-
clusion of the former civilian politicians would
automatically eliminate politics from the country's
life. But while national congressmen and state
deputies were despised and labelled the political
class (people affected by a civilian disease that
had to be tolerated, even if under strict control)
in fact political activity was as healthy and
vigorous as ever, both within the army itself and
through the networks organised around high
officials, ministers, chairmen of state-owned com-
panies and banks which Cardoso has referred to
as "bureaucratic rings.
By 197 1-72 the frictions between different interest
groups, both inside and outside the army, had
become more acute. The fact that elections lacked
any political meaning as well as the increasing
censorship of the press was regarded by certain
sectors of the power structure as more of a
liability than an asset. With political life dis-
persed and atomised, how was one to know who
represented whom? How were decisions to be
taken when interests of different economic and
regional pressure groups clashed? And as the
army, after almost a decade of political rule,
began to break into political and entrepreneurial
factions, many military men came to realise that
behind-the-scenes politics in the military establish-
ment could jeopardise its ability to impose inter-
nal consensus through hierarchical rules. Thus, by
1974 when Geisel was inaugurated, the in-
adequacy of the official ideology was clear, and
the need for new institutional solutions was
urgently felt. Although the MDB's landslide vic-
tory in 1974 elections (only seven months after
Geisel's inauguration) was an almost incredible
surprise to everybody (including MDB leaders),
it had to be tolerated as a tentative step toward
these new solutions.
But meanwhile the economic miracle, based
mainly on the expansion of durable consumer
goods production for the limited market con-
stituted by the new upper middle-class of pro-
fessionals, technocrats and business executives,
had exhausted itself. The internal dynamism of
Brazilian political economy required a shift to-
wards capital goods import substitution, which in
its turn required additional imports and long term
investment: hence both external and internal in-
flationary pressures. The rise in oil prices, world
recession and external inflation were indeed the
last straw. But they were not the first and only
cause of Brazil's internal economic problems as
claimed by the official rhetoric.
Although economic growth has not yet signi-
ficantly slowed down since the years of the
miracleit dropped only from 11 per cent in
1972 to 8 per cent in 1976the new economic
context has increased friction between the three
main actors of the political scene: the state man-
agers, the national entrepreneurs and the multi-
nationals, each one of them related to military
groups through its own series of bureaucratic
rings.
During 1976 government political and economic
discussions became so erratic and contradictory
as to suggest that the hegemonic alliance was
disintegrating. It soon became evident that Geisel
was losing control and was being directly chal-
lenged by different opposition groups which in-
cluded military officers, prepared to resort to
active terrorism. In the autumn there began a
series of violent terrorist actions such as the
bombing of a series of civilian liberal institutions
such as the Press and Bar Associations, the
kidnap of a bishop, and other events whose main
purpose seemed to be to prove Geisel's lack of
power or to test his willingness to shift political
alliances. Again, the "struggle between the SS
and the Wehrmacht".
What SS meant for the minister who coined the
metaphor is far from vague. He clearly referred
to the unofficial, although well-known army de-
partments created in every Brazilian state after
1968, specially trained by American advisers to
deal with the guerrilla movements through widely
known methods. It is frequently alleged that these
groups receive finance from both national and
multinational corporations. Certainly, most of
them became closely associated with, if not con-
trolled by, certain civilian groups. After the
virtual annihilation of the guerrilla movement
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which was achieved by 1972 they were not dis-
banded. As official funding of their activity
shrank, private contributions and influence in-
creased. Yet in spite of being unofficial and highly
influenced by civilian interest groups, these
military organisations cannot be supposed to be
absolutely independent from the higher organs
of military security. To varying degrees, in differ-
ent situations, their actions must be either
approved or tolerated by a significant portion of
the generals in command.
In this context of political disintegration, the
elections of November, 1976, given their local
character, were less important in themselves than
as a test for the 1978 elections to congress.
MDB's victory in 1978 would imply its ability to
influence strongly, if not to decide, the outcome
of the indirect election of Geisel's successor. But
in spite of severe restrictions imposed on MDB's
electoral campaign and of Geisel throwing all
his presidential resources in support of ARENA,
the government vote, at slightly over 50 per cent
of the total, can hardly be regarded as a victory.
By January, political unrest in the business com-
munity, particularly in the industrialised state of
Sao Paulo, grew to a climax. An incredible,
almost surrealist debate took place on civilian
participation in political life in which almost every
participant said exactly the opposite of what
might have been expected on the basis of his
political past. Former fund-raisers for military
terrorist groups became outspoken against torture;
well-known opponents of nationalist economic
policies criticised the support multinationals re-
ceived from the Federal Government; the Minis-
ter of Industry, Severo Gomes, a former hard-
liner in Castelo Branco's cabinet, advocated
civilian participation in decisions; one of the most
prominent members of the national bourgeoisie
who had previously supported the regime, José
Papa Jr., referred to it as "spurious", and Paulo
Villares, the owner of one of the hrgest private
capital goods industries that has most benefited
from recent economic policies, labelled Geisel a
communist.
Any comprehensive interpretation of such a sur-
prising and contradictory debate is impossible. It
seems clear, however, that the hegemonic alliance
is deeply shaken, if not broken, and that not
one of its political partners is able to produce
an ideology or an institutional rearticulation of
the regime which could plausibly be put forward
as the expression of the nation's general interests.
In February, Geisel asked his old friend and
political partner, Severo Gomes, to submit his
resignation. And although no reason was stated
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for his removal it seems clear that it was intended
mainly as a warning that the debate should stop.
Then in April, Geisel carefully manoeuvred MDB
into a position where it had little alternative but
to vote against a relatively minor constitutional
amendment, causing its rejection by the congress.
On this pretext congress was suspended and the
Constitution was altered by decree, mainly to
modify electoral procedures in such a way as
to make it almost impossible for members of the
MDB to gain seats in congress or to obtain
access to executive positions as state governors
or mayors of municipalities.
This last act is nothing but a poor repetition of
the previous authoritarian responses to political
conflicts, made possible by the dual principles
within the regime referred to by Cardoso. But
the present crisis seems to be far more deep and
complex than those of 1965, 1968 and 1969.
Although the immediate origins of the present
crisis, like the previous ones, can be related to
the incapacity of the hegemcmnic alliance to pro-
duce a clearly defined political formula ièflecting
its pact of domination, what is new is the in-
crease in conflict within the pact itself.
The failure of Geisel's New Deal seems to have
undermined the military elite's belief in its ability
to accomplish its tutorial mission. A recent
manifesto signed by over 60 colonels demanded
the return of the armed forces to their barracks,
their main argument being that "the army as an
institution was being spoiled by its participation
in politics". A series of interviews with unnamed
generals published by a leading Sao Paulo news-
paper suggests that an intense debate is taking
place among bewildered army commanders.
The civilian camp is just as agitated and the over-
all result of Geisel's constitutional amendment
has been to create a surprisingly broad campaign
for a new constituent assembly. Even more sur-
prising is the large number of ARENA leaders
supporting the proposal. The growing rate of
inflation and the deflationary measures it will
sooner or later require are certainly not likely
to ease the frictions and conflicts which have
increased over the past two or three years.
Before 1964 the Brazilian ruling classes blamed
the plight of the country on the ignorant masses,
populism and foreign subversion. After the col-
lapse of the populist pact the military regime
purported to eliminate the masses from the
political scene. The only thing that was in reality
eliminated was the dominant classes' scapegoat
for the country's ills. Thirteen years later the
masses are still there, poorer and more oppressed
than ever. But they are not the same political
quantity as they used to be. Formerly, they may
have represented a known cost to the ruling class
for the limited concessions they were able to
demand, or a risk to them which could be cal-
culated; but in any event, a known figure. Today,
they have become a mystery, an unknown and
feared potential for rulers who neither know how
to deal with them nor how to include them in
their calculations. Given these conditions, wide-
spread and growing claims for a freely elected
constitutional assembly sound almost fairytale-
like, and further events are hardly predictable.
However, as ARENA's senator Daniel Krieger
said in February, "No country can live for ever
with an undefined regime".
What options seem likely to be available in
Brazil? Probably the Mexican model of institu-
tionalised revolution with its velvet glove seldom
revealing its authoritarian iron fist is the dream
of most of Brazil's ruling ideologists. But if it
could not be achieved in 1964 it seems even more
remote now, after so many army officers have
spent 13 years tasting, or expecting to taste, the
benefits of political and economic power. It is
not impossible though, and Geisel's frustrated
New Deal, with its appeal for the "creative
imagination of politicians" in 1975, may be inter-
preted as a first attempt in that direction. The
transition might be signalled by Geisel selecting,
not a four star active General, but a retired one
or even a civilian to succeed him. And a new
regime based on controlled cooption rather than
the present violent suppression of the masses
might begin to emerge.
Ou the other hand, given the growing dissatis-
faction within the army, the ideological ebullience
among mid-ranking officers and the loss of
prestige of ESG doctrine, a leftwards movement
cannot be excluded. The doctrines of ESG were
originally elaborated under the pressure of the
cold war. They rested on the twin principles of
development and national security according to
which economic development was viewed as a
necessary condition of Brazil's participation in the
defence of Western civilisation against the red
threat. After the Cuban revolution and its claim
to turn the Andes into Latin America's Sierra
Maestra by guerrilla warfare, the emphasis
shifted from external to internal security. But
today, the internal enemy is no longer visible and
security sounds little more than rhetoric. In the
meantime, if not development, a massive process
of economic growth has taken place in conditions
that have strikingly revealed how fallacious and
harmful growth can be when regarded as an end
in itself.
These facts do not go unnoticed by junior and
middle-ranking officers. Besides the recent
Colonels' Manifesto, it is known that study groups
are mushrooming in the officer corps, some of
them devoting their attention to a variety of
authors ranging from Marx, Althusser and
Poulantzas to exiled Brazilian and Latin
American social scientists. Thus, a Portuguese-
style intervention cannot be completely excluded.,
Of course this remains a fairly remote possibility,
but the political, institutional and ideological con-
fusion of the last three months may increase its
chances, as may the regime's frictions with the
Catholic Church and with the US government on
the questions of human rights and atomic energy.
When President Geisel appeared on television to
announce the suspension of Congress, his main
argument was that it was controlled by "a dic-
tatorship of the minority". When shortly after-
wards 10,000 students marched in central Sao
Paulo to demonstrate against the regime, calling
for amnesty, free elections and an end to political
repressionan event that would have been almost
impossible a year or two agosome hardline
military circles began to put forward surrealistic
theories about a joint conspiracy by the CIA and
KGB to destabilise the government.7
Ideology normally contains an element of
deliberate mystification, creating a twilight zone
between false consciousness and deliberate dis-
tortion of reality. But there are also minimum
requirements of internal consistency and relation
to reality as it is culturally and socially per-
ceived. Nowadays the political rhetoric of all the
different sectors of Brazil's ruling classes seems
definitely to have exceeded these limits. The crisis
of the regime appears so deep and its ability to
produce any consistent ideology so limited, that
it is easier to see through the regime's ideological
formulas and to acquire a better understanding of
what the population's interests really are. Under
these conditions hopes that political change will
bring better conditions for those who have always
been excluded may not be just wishful thinking.
7 However, I personally do not believe such a massive demon-
stration, as well as the ones that followed on May 19th, to
have been possible without sorne support from army factions.
As a matter of fact thore sre persistent rumours of the
'Colonels' Manifesto' group having de% eloped into a more
organised politicsl faction, colling themselves the Military
Movement for Domocratic Constitutico. Yet, ther initials,
MMDC. are as:ciated with the Paulista Revolution of 1932,
against Vargas.
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